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ACE Research Vignette: Exploring the “Dark Side” of Entrepreneurship 
 
This series of research vignettes is aimed at sharing current and interesting research findings from our team of 
international Entrepreneurship researchers. In this vignette, Dr Rene Bakker explores “the dark side” of entrepreneurship. 
 
Background and Research Question 
 
Entrepreneurship is often understood to be inherently ‘good’. Terms often associated with entrepreneurship comprise the 
gamut of favourable connotations from “innovation” and “change” to “growth” and “economic development”. However, if 
we understand entrepreneurship as being about the discovery and exploitation of opportunities, there really is not 
necessarily any moral good in entrepreneurship per se.  
 
The present research project tried to empirically trace three instances of “dark” entrepreneurship, that is to say, 
entrepreneurship that is both illegal and covert, for which such data is historically available. Assuming that in order for 
people to consider “dark entrepreneurship” such efforts should be resilient against attempts to disrupt the venture, our 
focus is on what makes “dark networks” (one example of dark entrepreneurship) resilient: 
 
What are the factors that render dark networks more or less resilient? 
 
From previous research, a number of prior indications were available (see Figure 1), which formed the starting point of our 
study. 
 
FIGURE 1. A Model of Dark Network Resilience (from Milward & Raab, 2006: 349). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How we investigated this 
 
The problem with studying dark entrepreneurship is that it is, by very definition, covert. This places an emphasis on 
studying historical cases, for which trials, testimony, and reports are available as a data sources. We selected three, namely 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC); the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia (FARC); and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  
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Between December 2006 and July 2010, we took a broad approach toward gathering data, applying what is known as data 
triangulation, i.e. combining multiple sources of data to obtain a more accurate picture. We also consulted extensively with 
intelligence experts from around the world on the nature of the three networks that we studied. For example, most data 
on MK was collected through submissions by the ANC to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, which 
has in turn documented MK’s history, operational activity, and historical facts in exchange for amnesty for all who testified, 
as long as the truth was told. As such, many of MK’s internal documents are, perhaps surprisingly, publicly available and 
included in our analysis.  
 
What we found 
 
This exploratory study found that the resilience of dark networks and the entrepreneurial actions behind it result from a 
complex interplay between situational context and network level variables that is beyond the confines of a 2-page vignette 
to explain. One specific factor that clearly emerged, however, from our study that some might find surprising is the 
importance of legitimacy. In order to be resilient, our findings indicate, dark entrepreneurship, just like more common and 
acceptable forms of entrepreneurship, needs to appeal to at least some stakeholders in the dark network’s environment. 
This finding constitutes quite a leap from many policy initiatives that are geared solely toward the eradication of dark 
entrepreneurship by blunt force. We find that such blunt attempts can have unintended side effects: For every MK 
combatant killed by police fire, ten new ones stood up to join the early entrepreneurs who started the initially small 
network.  
 
Another important finding pertains to speed: to a large extent, dark entrepreneurship resilience is based on how rapidly a 
dark network can adapt to the changes that have occurred in its capabilities after a shock of major proportions. If a 
government or other can follow up its gains and delay this adaptation, dark entrepreneurs are more likely to falter. MK 
made a juvenile mistake that almost destroyed it, and it was brought slowly back to life by the repression, violence, and 
international outrage against apartheid and the Afrikaner regime in Pretoria. The LTTE adapted well in its tactics and in 
maintaining its operational activity until its entrepreneur and central leader, Prabhakaran, became unable or unwilling to 
change tactics that had served him well for many years.  
 
More generally, the variables of legitimacy and speed indicate that dark entrepreneurship might, in its functioning and 
antecedents, be more alike other types of entrepreneurship than some might like us to believe. 
 
Business and Policy Advice 
 
In essence, the policy problem regarding dark entrepreneurship is to limit it, or change it in more productive activities. 
With regard to limiting it, it seems that if you can reduce the resource denominator, the dark entrepreneur will face 
constrained choices about its options and its resilience should decrease Our results thus imply that policymakers should 
pay close attention to the management of public opinion by avoiding collateral damage to the degree possible, or using 
what has also been called “the hearts and minds” approach.  
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